NORTH KOREA MISSILE MILESTONES (1969-2005)

North Korea Missile Milestones - 1969-2005

The Risk Report
Volume 11 Number 5 (September-October 2005)

1969-70: North Korea obtains FROG-5 and FROG-7A missiles from the Soviet Union.

1976: Egypt sends Soviet Scud-B missiles to North Korea.

1984: North Korea successfully tests its first reverse-engineered Scud-B missile.

1984: An Iranian businessman and a Soviet émigré are indicted in New York for conspiring to smuggle U.S. missile guidance components to North Korea.

1985: Iran agrees to finance the development of North Korean Scud missiles in exchange for Scud-B technology and an option to buy the missiles when they become available.

1987: Iran and North Korea sign a $500 million arms deal that includes the purchase of 90 to 100 Scud-Bs by Tehran.

1987-88: North Korea delivers approximately 100 Scud-B missiles to Iran.

1989: Two Japanese companies ship spectrum analyzers to North Korea, which can be used to improve missile accuracy.

1990: North Korea successfully tests a Scud-C missile, hitting targets off North Korea's eastern coast from a base in the Kangwon Province; Iran tests what U.S. intelligence identifies as a North Korean version of the Scud-C.

1991-92: North Korea delivers an estimated 24 Scud-Cs and 20 mobile launchers to Syria, and ships additional Scuds to Syria through Iran.

1992: Russia prevents some 60 Russian rocket scientists from going to North Korea.

1992: The U.S. Department of State sanctions entities in North Korea, Iran and Syria for "missile technology proliferation activities."

1993: North Korea successfully tests the Nodong missile to a range of about 500km.

1995: According to comments by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Iran has received four Scud TELs from North Korea.

1996: The United States and North Korea begin bilateral talks on how to curb North Korea's missile exports and freeze its missile development.

1996: Taiwanese Customs officials seize 200 barrels (15 tons) of ammonium perchlorate, reportedly from North Korea's Lyongaksan General Trading Corporation, on a North Korean freighter bound for Pakistan's SUPARCO (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission).May 1997: North Korea tests its AG-1 cruise missile. A Pentagon official downplays the threat, saying that it uses "unimpressive, old technology" from Russian Styx and Chinese Silkworm missiles.

September 1997: A U.S. military satellite detects the deployment of a Nodong-1 missile in possible preparation for a test launch. The missile is believed to be capable of reaching Tokyo.

September 1997: A U.S. State Department official claims that North Korea earned close to $1 billion from missile sales over the past decade, making it the foremost missile exporter in the world.

October 1997: Two North Korean defectors testify before a U.S. Senate Committee. Choi Ju-hwal, a former colonel in North Korea's Ministry of the People's Army from 1968-1995, states that North Korea transferred missile technology and experts to Egypt in the early 1980s and "has been engaged" in a plan to jointly develop missiles with Egypt. Ko Young-hwan, a formerly employed in North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1978-1991, testifies that North Korea primarily exports missiles to Iran, Syria, Egypt and Libya.

June 1998: North Korea publicly admits that it exports missiles and demands that the United States "lift the economic embargo [on North Korea] as early as possible and make a compensation for the losses to be caused by discontinued missile export."

August 1998: North Korea tests a nuclear-capable Taepodong-1 missile. The missile flies over northern Japan and lands in the Pacific Ocean.

September 1998: North Korea announces that the recent test of a Taepodong missile was actually a launch to deploy a satellite.

September 1998: The U.S. State Department admits that North Korea did attempt to orbit a satellite as it had claimed, but failed. A three-stage Taepodong rocket was launched, but the satellite fell into the Pacific still attached to the third stage.

November 1998: According to U.S. intelligence and diplomatic sources, North Korea is building two new launch facilities for the Taepodong-1 and is increasing its production of short-range missiles.

February 1999: George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), tells Congress that North Korea is developing missiles that are capable of hitting the continental United States.

June 1999: Indian officials stop a shipment, aboard the North Korean vessel Kuwolsan, of what one Indian government official describes as "an entire assembly line" for Scud-B and -C missiles. U.S. intelligence officials assert that the shipment, which was documented as headed for a fictitious company in Malta, in fact, was en route from North Korea to Libya. The cargo, falsely labeled "water refining equipment," includes components for missile subassembly such as tips of nose cones and sheet metal for rocket frames, machine tools for setting up a fabrication facility, instrumentation for evaluating performance of a full missile system, equipment for calibrating missile components, and engineers' drawings.

July 1999: North Korea proceeds with plans to test-fire the Taepodong-2, which has an estimated range of 3,750 miles, far enough to hit Alaska and Hawaii.

July 1999: Two members of the Japanese parliament claim that semiconductors and argon gas burners used in North Korea's missile program came from Japan.

July 1999: South Korea reports that North Korea is building an underground missile launch site at Yeongjeo-dong, within a dozen miles of the Chinese border.

September 1999: North Korean TV displays a Taepodong-1 missile, allowing analysts to confirm that its first stage has a single engine exhaust and not a cluster of four smaller motors as originally believed. The single exhaust lends support to the allegation that Pyongyang helped Pakistan develop its Ghauri missile and helped Iran develop its Shahab-3 missile, and that both are similar to the Nodong.

September 1999: American and North Korean delegates meet in Berlin, where North Korea agrees to freeze the testing of long-range missiles and in response the U.S. agrees to ease some economic sanctions.

October 1999: North Korea declares its right to launch missiles, just one week after pledging to freeze long-range missile tests.

October 1999: A U.S. National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) report says North Korea is continuing to develop the Taepodong-2 missile, which NAIC has classified as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

October 1999: North Korea has offered to sell a Scud missile factory to Sudan.

January 2000: A Hong Kong company is supplying North Korea with Chinese-made missile components and technology.

February 2000: North Korea sold Iran 12 medium-range ballistic missile engines in November 1999. Intelligence officials say the engines are the same as those used in the Nodong medium-range missile, which Iran uses in the first stage of the Shahab-3 missile.

February 2000: U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources allege that Western and American technology obtained by Egyptian government-owned companies is being sent to North Korea and is being adapted and returned as advanced missile components for a 1000-km medium-range ballistic missile that Egypt is developing. There are also concerns about the possibility that Egypt has been provided technology for the Taepodong long-range missile, and that Egypt may have sent North Korea technology acquired during Egypt's Condor missile program.

April 2000: The United States imposed sanctions against North Korean and Iranian entities involved in Scud missile transfers; among those sanctioned was North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong aerospace company.

June 2000: Less than a week after a historic meeting between the leaders of North and South Korea, the Clinton administration eases some sanctions against North Korea.

June 2000: North Korea declares that it will extend its moratorium on long-range missile test flights, and the United States responds with plans to resume talks on curbing North Korea's missile program.

June 2000: Russia is selling missile technology, including a special aluminum alloy, connectors and relays, and laser gyroscopes, to North Korea.

July 2000: North Korea refuses to stop developing missiles it says are for self-defense, claiming that Washington has deployed "thousands of missiles" that threaten it. However, North Korea does offer to halt missile technology exports in exchange for $1 billion a year.

July-December 2000: The CIA in its semi-annual report to Congress says North Korea continued its procurement of ballistic missile-related raw materials and components, especially through North Korean firms based in China. North Korea also continues to export ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.

October 2000: U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il hold the highest level talks to date between the two countries. According to Albright, the two parties discussed North Korea's indigenous missile programs and exports, as well as Kim Jong-il's "ideas of exchanging [North Korea's] restraint in missiles for launches of [North Korea's] satellites."

May 2001: North Korean leader Kim Jong-il tells European officials that North Korea will not launch ballistic missiles until at least 2003, unilaterally extending a moratorium on the missile testing.

December 2001: The U.S. National Intelligence Council releases the unclassified version of its National Intelligence Estimate, which states that the United States will "most likely" face an intercontinental ballistic missile threat from North Korea before 2015. The report further notes that North Korea's Taepodong-2 program may be ready for flight-testing, "probably" in a space launch configuration.

June 2002: In its semi-annual report to Congress on nonproliferation, the CIA asserts that North Korea is "nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles" and demonstrates "a willingness to sell complete systems and components" to other countries.

October 2002: The New York Times reports that U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea's nuclear program apparently as part of a barter deal beginning around 1997, in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with ballistic missiles.

November 2002: Spanish warships halt and U.S. authorities board a North Korean freighter, named So San, 600 miles off the Horn of Africa. The shipment, headed for Yemen, contained 15 Scud missiles, 15 high-explosive conventional warheads, and nitric acid rocket fuel, according to Spain's defense minister, Frederico Trillo.

December 2002: The United States agrees to release the ship containing North Korean missiles bound for Yemen. A senior U.S. official argues that the United States did not have the authority to hold the ship, which had flown a Cambodian flag and was engaged in fulfilling a "state-to-state" commercial transaction. An unnamed senior administration official suggests that the ship was freed since Yemen does not constitute a threat and is partner in the U.S. "war on terrorism."

2003: South Korea's Ministry of National Defense issues a report stating that North Korea has deployed Scud-B and Scud-C missiles with a maximum range of 300 to 500 km and the Nodong-1 with a maximum range of up to 1,300 km. In addition to noting the August 1998 test of the 2,000 km range Taepodong-1, the report announces that the 6,000 km-range Taepodong-2 is "currently" under development.

March 2003: The Washington Times suggests that recent U.S. sanctions on Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) resulted from the purchase and receipt, via C-130 aircraft, of North Korean Nodong missiles that are "fully assembled and ready to fly."

May 2003: North Korea appears to have successfully tested an engine for a long-range missile, which is believed to be for the Taepodong-2 missile, according to unnamed diplomatic sources quoted in South Korea's JoongAng Ilbo newspaper.

May 2003: The Japanese periodical, Yomiuri Shimbun, reports that North Korea is believed to have exported $580 million worth of missiles to the Middle East in 2001, according to an unnamed U.S. military officer stationed in South Korea. The officer also states that North Korea possesses 600 to 750 ballistic missiles, with 175 to 200 believed to be Nodong missiles.

May 2003: A man identified as a North Korean expert in missile guidance, who claimed he had worked at a plant in Chagang Province before defecting to South Korea in 1997, states in testimony before a Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee that he helped to test-fire a missile in Iran during the summer of 1989. The defector with the alias Bok Koo-lee also declared that Iran later became a client for North Korean missile guidance control equipment and that 90% of the components came from a pro-Pyongyang ethnic Korean group in Japan.

May 2003: The Washington Post reports a crackdown by Japanese officials on companies that have been suspected of supplying North Korea with WMD-related equipment, after the Japanese company Meishin attempts to export specialized power-supply devices that can be used in either uranium enrichment or missile launch development.

June 2003: North Korea indefinitely suspends service of the only passenger ferry that runs between North Korea and Japan in response to Japanese cargo vessel inspections. According to testimony given by North Korean defectors, the Mangyongbong-92 was used to smuggle missile parts to North Korea.

July 2003: The New York Times reports that CIA officials have identified an advanced nuclear testing facility via satellite in Youngdoktong, with equipment for explosives tests, suggesting that North Korea is attempting to combine its missile and nuclear programs.

July 2003: The South Korean Defense Ministry claims that North Korea deployed a "battalion" of Nodong missiles in June 2002.

August 2003: Taiwan confiscates 158 barrels of phosphorus pentasulfide, which can be used as a precursor for VX nerve agent, from a North Korean ship named Be Gaehung docked in Taiwan's Kaohsiung Harbor. According to the ship's manifest, the cargo was en route from Thailand to the North Korean port of Nanpo.

October 2003: David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group, says that just months prior to the Iraq war, Baghdad paid North Korea $10 million for Nodong medium-range missile technology. Even though Baghdad advanced the money for this deal, no missile technology was transferred.

October 2003: South Korea's Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Ki-beom relates the contents of a ministry report to parliament, stating that North Korea has exported approximately 400 Scud missiles and missile-related components to such Middle Eastern countries as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, since the mid-1980s.

November 2003: Two North Korean diplomats say that North Korea would agree to "not manufacture nuclear weapons, allow annual inspections, dissolve the nuclear facilities, and suspend the testing of missiles or the missile export or such kind of things," in return for a written security guarantee, economic compensation, and a pledge from the United States not to hinder North Korea's economic development.

November 2003: An article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, citing unnamed U.S. and Asian officials, suggests that Myanmar has begun negotiating the purchase of surface-to-surface missiles from North Korea. Rangoon-based diplomats say that about 20 North Korean technicians are working at the Monkey Point naval base, possibly getting ready to install the missiles on Burmese naval vessels.

January 2004: The Japanese periodical Sankei Shimbun cites an unnamed source as saying that a WMD and missile "triangle" of cooperation exists between North Korea, Iran, and Libya. The source suggests that North Korea has provided technical assistance to Libya to domestically produce Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. North Korea has also discussed with Iran the possibility of developing Nodong missiles at a Scud missile manufacturing plant in Libya.

January 2004: The Nigerian government announces that North Korea agreed to sell it missile technology, under an agreement between Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar and Yang Hyong Sop, vice president of North Korea's Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly.

February 2004: Nigeria rejects a North Korean offer to sell it missiles. According to the Los Angeles Times, this rejection occurred under U.S. pressure.

March 2004: U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Matthew Daley, tells a Congressional panel that the United States has concerns over North Korea's alleged efforts to sell surface-to-surface missiles to Myanmar. Myanmar's officials have indicated they have not accepted, but Daley adds that the United States and Rangoon already have a "military and trade" relationship.

May 2004: The South Korean periodical Choson Ilbo reports that U.S. intelligence satellites have uncovered 10 new ballistic missiles and mobile launching pads at two underground ballistic missile bases, thought to be 80% complete, according to South Korean intelligence. One base is in Yangdok, east of Pyongyang, and the other is in Hochon, South Hamgyong province.

July 2004: South Korea's Defense Minister, Cho Young-gil, tells the National Assembly that North Korea is deploying new intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of up to 2,500 miles and testing a new main engine for its Taepodong-2 missile.

July 2004: Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto admits in an interview that Pakistan obtained missile technology from North Korea after she visited Pyongyang in December 1993.

August 2004: The Associated Press reports that an unnamed Bush administration official stated that North Korea is working on a new nuclear-capable ballistic missile based on Russian technology and assistance and is testing them by proxy in Iran.

December 2004: Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, states that North Korea's Taepodong-2 missile "could be flight tested at any time."

February 2005: An unnamed top U.S. official tells Time Magazine that there have been indications that Iran is giving North Korea telemetry and other data from missile tests that North Korea then uses for improvements in its own missile systems. In exchange, North Korea may be supplying engineering consultation for further Iranian missile tests.

May 2005: North Korea's missile test on May 1st may have involved a modified short-range ballistic SS-21 'Scarab' missile. According to a South Korean Yonhap News Agency report, Kim Sung-il, an official with South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a closed-door parliamentary session that the 100-120 km range missile was a KN-02, an upgraded version of the Soviet SS-21. The missile is a short-range, road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile that carries one warhead. Kim is also said to have suggested that North Korea's KN-02 test a few weeks earlier was a failure.

May 2005: Israeli military officials announce that Syria has test-fired a Scud-B and two Scud-D missiles for the first time since 2001. Israelis suggest that the missile tests were part of a program using North Korean technology and designed to deliverair-burst chemical weapons.